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Abstract
Automation has been changing the types and causes of hazards, and influ-
encing the way in which users interact with complex systems, particularly
challenging the notion of human control as a primary basis for hazard mitiga-
tion. In this paper, we explore this challenge and use an automotive driving
example to examine the distributed nature of the driving task.
We define an Enhanced Vehicle Control Model (VCM) that extends the
notion of controllability and joint cognition for highly automated tasks. We
apply the model to three contemporary driver assistance systems by under-
taking a scenario-based evaluation. As a conceptual model, the Enhanced
VCM shows potential to proactively identify the hazard causes associated
with a joint cognitive control. However, to provide utility and to become
an effective tool for the system analyst, an accompanying methodology is
needed.
Keywords: automated driving, functional safety, SOTIF, vehicle control
model, hazard analysis, joint cognitive system (JCS)
1. Introduction
Embedded electronic control systems first appeared in passenger vehicles
in the 1980’s and were introduced to replace specific mechanical engine con-
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trols (e.g. electronic ignition, fuel injection). However, the need for greater
efficiency and the introduction of more stringent emissions targets, meant
that within a decade everything from driver demand to air and fuel mix were
under the control of embedded programmable electronics. The proliferation
of such systems raised concerns about the impact that a control system failure
might have on vehicle safety. To address these concerns the UK government
set up the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA) con-
sortium in the early 1990’s, with the objective being to “provide assistance
to the automotive industry in the creation and application within a vehicle
system of safe, reliable software”. The “MISRA Guidelines” [1] provided the
practising engineer with guidance describing the activities necessary to eval-
uate the safety implications of programmable automotive systems, and to
achieve functional safety ; that is, the absence of unreasonable risk caused by
embedded electronics hardware and software faults. This included a method
for assessing risk (the MISRA Risk Model) that considered the effects of
failure on system behaviour (the hazards) and used, amongst other things,
the concept of controllability (i.e. the ability of the persons in harm’s way
to make the correct and timely reaction to avoid the harm) to estimate the
degree of risk associated with vehicle hazards.
When used to classify moving vehicle hazards, the concept of control-
lability has to date made the assumption that the vehicle driver is a part
of the control loop (Figure 1), and given that they are integral to control
they are always situationally aware. The introduction of evermore complex
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the move towards Highly
Automated Driving (HAD) changes this assumption. Not only is the driver’s
role and behaviour potentially changing [2–4], but also vehicles are becom-
ing part of a socio-technical transport system of systems; with the vehicle
potentially modifying its behaviour as a result of information received from
other vehicles, from roadside infrastructure, and from the Cloud.
Although having the potential to solve many of today’s automotive re-
lated transport issues, and contributing to WHO’s targets1, the introduction
of highly automated and self-driving vehicles is not without its challenges.
1The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that more than 1.25 million people
die each year as a result of road traffic accidents and nearly half of those are vulnerable
road users; i.e. pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists. . The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development includes halving the global number of deaths and injuries caused by road
accidents by 2020 [6].
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Figure 1: MISRA Control System View of the Vehicle [5]
The public will need assurances that such technology is safe2 and worthy
of their trust [7], legislators will need to adapt the whole-vehicle regulatory
framework upon which the technology is released into the market place, while
engineers will need to develop new methods to assess, validate and assure the
safety of such systems [8].
Typically the risk of hazards associated with fitting a new feature to the
vehicle is assessed using the ISO 26262 risk model that assumes the driver
is integral to vehicle control. The scope of ISO 26262 is also limited to haz-
ards caused by the malfunctioning behaviour of electrical/electronic (E/E)
systems installed in series production vehicles. In 2019 the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO) published a Publicly Available Specifi-
cation (PAS), entitled Safety Of The Intended Functionality (SOTIF), which
gives guidance on the development of systems whose Situational Awareness
(SA) is critical to safety. Although the SOTIF PAS could potentially be
applied to highly automated vehicle systems, its scope is the lower automa-
tion levels that require the driver to remain vigilant and responsible for
2Research suggests that if safety levels for self-driving technologies were comparable to
that of the human driver the general public would deem the risk unacceptable, whereas a 4
or 5 times safety improvement would be deemed tolerable. However, to be deemed broadly
acceptable the perceived risk would need to be hundreds of times better than today’s
accident statistics indicate [7]!
3
vehicle safety. Examples include Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), an SAE
Level 1 system [9] that automates longitudinal control, and ACC with Lane
Centring Assist, an SAE Level 2 system [9] that automates both lateral and
longitudinal control.
The first step in the SOTIF process is to identify any potential sources
of harm. That is, to identify the triggering events that could lead to hazards
and to evaluate the hazard risk. The process suggests prior knowledge and
field data as possible means of identifying triggering events [10], while for
risk classification the ISO 26262 risk schema is proposed [11]. This approach
still requires the automotive safety analyst to conduct thought experiments
to identify likely hazards and to reason about hazard risk. However, with
outcomes being influenced by the vehicle’s environment and the shared nature
of the driving task, reasoning about hazard risk becomes more complex.
1.1. Research Contribution
Our research aim is to produce a new basis from which to analyse the
hazard risk of HAD vehicle features. With our objective being to create
a suitable conceptual VCM and method that supports hazard analysis in
a HAD context. By including elements representing the shared cognitive
nature of the driving task, our research seeks to support the identification
of hazards and hazard causes not explored by contemporary hazard models.
This contributes a new dimension to automotive hazard analysis not covered
by the current automotive safety standards [10, 11] and extends the notion
of controllability and joint cognition for highly automated tasks, such as
driving.
This paper is the first part of a package of work, that focuses on the
development of the Enhanced VCM. In Section 2 we review the literature
that has informed the enhancements made to the original MISRA VCM
before describing the model itself in Section 3. Then in Section 4 we introduce
three HAD vehicle features, which we use to explore the potential utility of
our enhanced model. For example, can we describe each HAD features using
the model, and does the model highlight how contemporary approaches to
hazard, risk and controllability might need to change? Also, for HAD vehicle
features that require the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT), and hence vehicle
safety, to be shared between the human and the machine, is the model useful
in identifying hazard causes that exist because the DDT is shared?
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2. Literature Review
2.1. The Functional Safety Paradigm and What Needs to Change
The ‘Vienna Convention’ [12] requires that every moving vehicle shall
have a driver and that every driver shall at all times be able to control his
vehicle or to guide his animals. This gives rise to the implicit automotive
functional safety assumptions that: the driver is integral to vehicle control,
they will be situationally aware, and given that not every hazardous situation
on the road leads to an accident, the driver is often able to control the
situation and prevent an accident occurring. The driver’s intrinsic role in
vehicle control is evident in the MISRA Control System View of the Vehicle
(Figure 1).
Definition 1. The ISO 26262 automotive risk matrix [11] describes Risk
(R) as:
R = F (f, C, S)
where F is a function with parameters f representing the frequency of oc-
currence of a hazardous event, C the controllability , and S the severity of
the resulting harm.
By including a Controllability parameter the ISO 26262 risk matrix al-
lows credit to be taken for the ability the driver has to control the hazardous
situation3. However, human factors research suggests that automation will
potentially influence Controllability by impacting a driver’s ability to iden-
tify hazards [13], to react, to re-engage appropriately, [14] and to remain
situationally aware [15].
The current automotive functional safety paradigm is appropriate to
1990’s embedded control systems, whose functionality and interfaces can be
easily defined and bounded, and that hold the driver ultimately responsible
for vehicle safety [8]. In what ISO 26262 defines as the ‘Item’ the cause of
a hazard will be a hardware or systematic fault within the Item, with the
most appropriate mitigation action often being to simply disable the faulty
function until it is repaired. In defining its scope as “is intended to be applied
3with controllability being rated from C0 for controllable in general to C4 for difficult
to control or uncontrollable [11]
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to functions where proper system situational awareness is critical to safety,
and where that situational awareness is derived from complex sensors and
processing algorithms” the SOTIF PAS [10] acknowledges that the safety of
today’s HAD systems cannot be achieved by simply drawing a boundary
around a system and analysing what lies within. To compound the problem
the system is no longer the Item or even the vehicle, but instead a complex
system of systems, with the vehicle system potentially interacting with other
systems, the infrastructure and the Cloud.
When considered in the context of the automotive risk matrix, the MISRA
VCM (Figure 1) is useful in thought experiments which reason about vehicle
behaviour, driver behaviour and automotive risk [16]. Although intended
to represent manual driving, many elements of the model remains relevant
today, and will remain relevant while vehicles continue to have driver controls.
However, for the MISRA VCM to remain a useful model for hazard analysis
it needs to: allow automation’s influence to be considered, represent the
shared nature of the Driver Control task, and reflect the human / machine
interactions that are pertinent to safety. The MISRA VCM is also drawn from
the perspective of a single vehicle. To maintain its usefulness the model needs
to represent information coming to the ego vehicle4 from external sources
(e.g. other vehicles, roadside infrastructure, the Cloud) and help the analyst
to consider how errors in that information might influence vehicle safety.
Additionally, the model needs to consider other road users in the context of
the ego vehicle’s safety, and potentially the influence that the ego vehicle’s
behaviour might have on other road users [17].
2.2. What is Driving?
Those of us who are qualified and have been driving for a period of time
will likely take the task of driving for granted. We understand what it means
to drive a car, but would probably find it difficult to articulate each control
action and concept used. To explore the notion of driving and to inform
how automation might change the assumptions on which the MISRA VCM
is based, we reviewed the driver behaviour modelling research. We combined
that with a review of the literature pertaining to situational awareness to
understand how automation might affect driving and hence vehicle safety.
4the term used by the industry to describe ‘our’ vehicle
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Figure 2: Michon’s Hierarchical Control Model (HCM) [19]
2.2.1. Driver behaviour
Driver behaviour can be thought of as resolving the multiple possible ac-
tions (or driving related subtasks) and their effects that are presented simul-
taneously in a dynamically changing environment [18], and driver behaviour
research can be traced back to Gibson and Crooks’ 1938 research. However,
it is suggested that driver behaviour research stagnated in the 1970’s until in
1985 Michon published his seminal Hierarchical Control Model (HCM). The
HCM (Figure 2) has three layers, (Strategy, Manoeuvring and Control), and
Michon suggests that to be comprehensive a driver model should contain all
3 layers and provide information flow control between the layers [19]. The
HCM has formed the foundation of subsequent driver conceptualisations [20],
although contemporary driver models exist [21] their purpose has tended to
mimic driver behaviour in a simulation context, rather than conceptualising
driver behaviour in a hazard identification and analysis context.
2.2.2. Situational awareness
Fundamental to a driver’s ability to safely control their vehicle, in a con-
tinually changing environment, is developing and maintaining an awareness of
the objects and threats in that environment. This dynamic mental model of
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the driving environment is often referred to as situational awareness (SA)[22].
Popular and widely cited5, Endsley’s 3 Level Model [23] considers an indi-
vidual’s SA as: Level 1 SA perception of the elements in the environment
relating to the current task, Level 2 SA comprehension of situation involv-
ing comprehending data from Level 1 (i.e. the significance of objects and
events), and Level 3 SA projection of future states involving predicting the
future states of the system and elements using a combination of Level 1 and
2 SA related mental models. Endsely’s Model has been used in combination
with Michon’s Model to consider the SA needed by each hierarchical control
level [24, 25], giving a concept in which the criticality of SA mental models
[26] and factors affecting SA, such as distractions [22], might be considered
in the context of vehicle safety.
2.3. Analysing Complex Systems
Since the 1930’s analysts have used accident models to understand
accidents and thus manage safety. Causal-chain or ‘chain of events’ models,
with the Domino Model perhaps being the earliest example, have been used
to describe the accident sequence [27]. In common with other domains, the
automotive industry also uses the notion of a hazard causal-chain. With a
system levelmalfunction [11] leading to a vehicle level hazard, which presents
in a given operational situation to give rise to an accident.
Although detailed and potentially longwinded, vehicle hazard analysis
has typically been a desk-based activity characterised by a systematic review
of functional failure effects, energetic discussions about probable driver con-
trollability, and large spreadsheets capturing the detail of the assumptions
made. While hazard analysis remains critical to achieving functional safety
and SOTIF, the continued feasibility of undertaking affective and timely haz-
ard analysis in a highly automated and connected driving context has been
bought into question [28].
Two systemic accident models have emerged in recent years: the Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), and the Functional Res-
onance Accident Model (FRAM). Common to both models is the notion that
accidents occur when complex systems are no longer able to cope with adap-
tations; either when a control system applies insufficient constraints (or un-
safe control actions) to maintain safety (in the case of STAMP) [29], or when
5having >8000 citations (checked May 2020)
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Figure 3: An Enhanced Vehicle Control Model
a control system is unable to tolerate system variances (in the case of FRAM)
[30]. STAMP has gained traction as an alternative or complementary safety
analysis method to Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) or Hazard and Oper-
ability (HAZOP) studies, which are the methods more typically used in the
automotive domain [31]. While the ability to consider human behaviour in
hazard analysis is clearly beneficial [32], our observation is that the ‘Control
Structure Diagrams’ created to perform such analysis are themselves com-
plex. Therefore, could an enhanced MISRA VCM provide a simpler Control
Structure Diagram for the safety analysis of HAD vehicle features?
3. An Enhanced Automotive Risk Model
The MISRA VCM (Figure 1) remains valid for vehicle systems where the
driver remains an integral part of vehicle control and has utility supporting
hazard analysis and risk assessments (HARA)[16]. However, once a part of
the Driver Control element is replaced with automation, then model defi-
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ciencies become apparent. The following section describes the development
of a VCM enhanced to remain relevant and useful in the analysis of highly
automated and connected vehicles.
3.1. Model Construction
Initially we modified the MISRA VCM by ‘splitting’ the Driver Control
element between the human and machine actors, and using data-information-
knowledge-wisdom pyramids [33] to represent the different information used
for human and machine perception. However, having attempted to modify
the model in this way, two things became apparent: Firstly, this approach
simply added complexity to the diagram, which intuitively would never lead
to an elegant solution. Secondly, it did highlight a stark difference between
how the human driver perceived the environment and how the machine would
perceive the same environment. This raised the question as to how this
difference might be used to highlight potential safety concerns, particularly
when control is being shared or transferred between the human and the
machine.
To reduce complexity, we used Michon’s HCM (Figure 2) to represent
the joint control task, but could the automated functions also fit within this
hierarchy? In a discussion about multi-sensor environmental perception, a
perception layer model was used to describe the interface between sensors
and the higher level automated driving functions [34]. Considered together,
a relationship could be made between the three models allowing the enhanced
representation of the Driver Control element to be made.
While the meaning of each MISRA VCM element is perhaps intuitive in
a manual driving context, the meaning becomes less clear in a highly auto-
mated and connected vehicle context, necessitating the underlying meaning
of each model element to be defined (see Section 3.2). The MISRA VCM also
used solid and dotted lines without explanation (see Figure 1). We interpret
the solid lines to represent physical interfaces or interactions, and the dotted
lines to represent the interpretation or perception of something physical. We
then reviewed the model from a psychological view point. The result of which
was the inclusion of a mechanism that represented updating of agent prior
knowledge (mental models), and future state predictions, based on sensory
perception [35]; effectively, the notion of obtaining and maintaining SA. This
is represented in the enhanced model by a comparator. Combining these
concepts gave rise to the Enhanced VCM (Figure 3).
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3.2. Elements of the Model Explained
Navigating the model (Figure 3) from the top left, the first input is Driver
Goal. These are the driver’s6 high-level objectives (e.g. drive to work, take
the kids to school, or just go for a ride in the country). Achieving these goals
requires strategic planning, represented by the Strategy Level box. These
routing / planning type decisions will be influenced by information (e.g. the
current Traffic Environment) and any goal related constraints (e.g. to ar-
rive by a particular time), and typically occur over a long time-frame which
does not require a real-time response [36]. Route speed criteria represents
interlayer targets information from the Strategic Level influencing the Ma-
noeuvring Level. For example the level of urgency, as a leisurely drive may
become faster paced as traffic adversely affects progress.
Moving anti-clockwise around the model, the Manoeuvring Level repre-
sents the monitoring and regulating tasks, like negotiating a junction or de-
termining the appropriate speed for the conditions. These will be rule based
real-time tasks that typically last a few seconds [36], be predominately data
driven and largely constrained by the characteristics of the given situation,
and be in support of the goals set by the Strategy Level .
In Michon’s HCM the Manoeuvring Level has two outputs – Controlled
Action Patterns and Feedback Criteria. The literature doesn’t convey the
intention of these two outputs. We postulate that the Controlled Action Pat-
terns represent the rule-based [37] behaviour needed to conduct the intended
manoeuvre, while Feedback Criteria represents the information needed by the
Control Level to successfully undertake the desired manoeuvre. For example,
knowing that on a cold day the road might be slippery so choosing to limit
the magnitude of steering and braking inputs.
Similar to Michon’s HCM, theManoeuvring Layer receives environmental
information, but via the Models / Perception and Error elements. Also, we
postulate that the Manoeuvring Layer would receive and make decisions
based on feedback received from the Control Layer. The final output from
theManoeuvring Layer is a feedback path to the Strategy Level. For example,
information about the expected arrival time of the current journey.
Below the Manoeuvring Level is the Control Level, which contains the
low level driving behaviours that are largely skill-based [37], automatic and
occurring in the millisecond time-frame [36]. Example Control Level tasks
6or vehicle occupants in a fully automated driving context
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include steering, braking and accelerating. Being the basal level in the hierar-
chy, the Control Level has only one output; the Automatic Action Patterns
that comprise the control actions to the vehicle control system, which we
refer to as the Vehicle Smart Actuators.
Like the other levels, the Control Level has inputs that will modify its
behaviour. In Michon’s HCM these were the environment, Automatic Ac-
tion Patterns feedback and Feedback Criteria from the Manoeuvring Level.
We suggest that environmental inputs, both about the physical environment
(e.g. carriageway edge, air temperature) and the Complete Vehicle Behaviour
(e.g. lateral and longitudinal acceleration), and Automatic Action Patterns
feedback (e.g. steering torque, display information) will come via the Models
/ Perception and Sensing route.
The Sensing block represents both the human senses and the machine sen-
sors used to collect Vehicle System Behaviour, Complete Vehicle Behaviour,
Physical Environment, and Traffic Environment data. For the human this
might be sight and the vestibular system, for the machine this might be
RADAR, LiDAR and cameras. The Models / Perception block is included to
represent the idea of the controlling agent (i.e. human, automation, or both)
obtaining and maintaining SA within the model. The Model / Perception
block represents both the model of the environment in which the vehicle is
operating, and the perception of the vehicle’s behaviour within that environ-
ment. For example, the model might include information about stationary
objects in the vehicle’s physical environment or data regarding the current
vehicle speed. We postulate that these models will be developed from in-
formation inferred from sensory data via the Sensing block, and updated
accordingly by new data received.
From a control perspective the path from physical system attributes (Ve-
hicle System Behaviour, Complete System Behaviour, Physical Environment,
Traffic Environment) through Sensing and Models / Perception can act as
a control path for both feedback (or compensatory) control or feed forward
control [36]. We postulate that large errors between the current Models /
Perception and new data being received via the Sensing block will poten-
tially influence those blocks and drive changes in cognition for the human
agent. The threshold at which this influence occurs might affect safety. For
example, the human might take back control prematurely because they per-
ceive an issue occurring, or they may continue to use the automated system in
inappropriate circumstances because they are unaware of inbuilt limitations
[38]. We have represented this notion by including an Error block having
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feedback paths to the Control Level, Manoeuvring Level and Strategy Level
blocks.
The last part of the enhanced model is the ‘plant model’. Although
representing a road vehicle, we envisage that other plant models (e.g. air-
craft, ship, off-road vehicle) could be substituted. The vehicle plant model
comprises the Tyre Contact Patch and the physical system attributes that in-
fluence and are influenced by the Tyre Contract Patch. This remains largely
unchanged from the original model (Figure 1). The Tyre Contact Patch is
the small area where the tyre and road surface are in physical contact, with
an amount of slip generating the friction needed for the tyre to apply a force
to the road surface, either laterally, longitudinally or both. The physical
system attributes of Physical Environment, Vehicle System Behaviour and
Vehicle Manoeuvre all influencing the forces being applied to the road by the
tyre, while the Complete Vehicle Behaviour is influenced by the forces that
result from the tyre-road interaction.
The Vehicle Manoeuvre represents the manoeuvre currently being car-
ried out by the vehicle and will influence how the Vehicle System Behaviour,
applied at the Tyre Contact Patch, translates to the Complete Vehicle Be-
haviour. For example, entering a corner too quickly may lead to excessive
side-slip resulting in vehicle under-steer. The Vehicle System Behaviour is
the vehicle level behaviour that occurs in response to system level changes
made by the smart actuators. For example, positive or negative torque being
applied to the vehicle’s driven wheels. Next, the Physical Environment rep-
resents the environment in which the vehicle is being operated (e.g. weather).
This will influence how the Vehicle System Behaviour translates to Complete
Vehicle Behaviour, but also environmental characteristics like temperature
will also influence the Vehicle System Behaviour. Finally Complete Vehicle
Behaviour represents the physical vehicle response, which can be described
using the 6 degrees of freedom rigid body model.
4. Evaluating the Enhanced Vehicle Control Model
By enhancing the MISRA VCM we aim to develop a model and analysis
method that supports automotive safety practitioners undertaking hazard
analyses [10, 11]. Before progressing further it is prudent to carry out a
preliminary evaluation of the model. This preliminary evaluation will take
ADAS features, having increasing levels of automation, and attempt to model
those systems using only the elements available in the enhanced model. By
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using ADAS features having progressively more authority over the DTT, and
hence vehicle safety, the model’s utility across different levels of automation
can be assessed. Also the identification of artefacts common across the au-
tomation levels, and that are critical to safety, will help shape the supporting
analysis method, which is the subject of future research.
4.1. Evaluation Method
To begin evaluating the Enhanced VCM required us to first define some
controlling functionality and to allocate that to the Strategy, Manoeuvring
and Control Levels. For this we turned to the Hierarchical Task Analysis
of Driving (HTAoD) taxonomy [39]. This taxonomy defines four categories
of driving task: “Perform basic control tasks”, “Perform operational driv-
ing tasks”, “Perform tactical driving tasks” and “Perform strategic driving
tasks”. We’ve assigned “Perform basic control tasks” to the Control Level,
“Perform operational driving tasks” and “Perform tactical driving tasks” to
the Manoeuvring Level, and “Perform strategic driving tasks” to the Strate-
gic level. The full HTAoD contains as many as six levels of abstraction for
each category. For our evaluation we chose a single level of abstraction (as
shown in Figure 4) to achieve the compromise between learning from the
detail, while avoiding becoming swamped by complexity.
For each task comprising vehicle control, the human or machine agents
can be designated as either doing, monitoring, or being responsible for the
safety of that task. Where “Do” refers to the agent undertaking the task,
“Monitor” represents the agent who is able to check the progress of the ac-
tivity under way, and “Safety” represents the agent who is deemed to be re-
sponsible for overall safety. The current insurance and regulatory paradigms
would suggest that the responsible agent is the human in all cases. However,
in an attempt to learn more from the evaluation, we have taken a more prag-
matic view. That is, to consider “safety responsibility” as the agent having
the potential to identify that an unsafe situation is developing and to take
the appropriate mitigating action7.
With the HTAoD tasks in mind we then considered the elements of the
Enhanced VCM, looking for clues as to what the model could tell us about the
safety of the different ADAS technologies chosen. We discuss the Enhanced
7The recent Law Commission review of the laws related to autonomous driving in the
UK contains the notion of a “user in charge” suggesting that the concept of a responsible
agent is likely to remain important [40].
14
Figure 4: Hierarchical Task Analysis of Driving (HTAoD) taxonomy [39]
VCM in the context of Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) (Section 4.1.1), ACC
with Lane Centring (Section 4.1.2) and Traffic Jam Assist (Section 4.1.3)
below.
4.1.1. Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) (SAE Level 1)
ACC is categorised as an SAE Level 1 [9] automation system because,
when activated by the driver, the vehicle system takes responsibility for lon-
gitudinal vehicle control (i.e. accelerating and braking). This is achieved
either by maintaining the speed set by the driver, or by reducing vehicle
speed to maintain a set distance (referred to as headway) to the vehicle in
front. Early ACC systems had limited capability and so were typically sold
as assistance system. Today’s systems are more capable, with the ability
to reliably reject non-traffic targets and having sufficient authority over the
vehicle’s control systems to bring the vehicle to a complete stop.
The matrix in Figure 5 has been coloured considering the DDT influ-
enced by the introduction of ACC. With ACC functionality controlling ve-
hicle speed to a value set by the driver it is fair to assume that the “Control
Vehicle Speed” and “Negotiate Gradients” HTAoD task will be influenced by
ACC. Additionally, with functionality to maintain the headway to the vehi-
cle in front, the feature must also be capable of “Decreasing Vehicle Speed”
and “Following Other Vehicles.” Our ACC vehicle feature also includes the
capability to brake the vehicle to a stand still, so the task of “Pulling Away
From Standstill” also warrants consideration.
Reflecting on ACC functionality in relation to the control layers (Figure
3) it is reasonable to expect the responsibility for all Strategy Level tasks
to remain with the human agent. The same is true of Manoeuvring Level
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tasks, with the exception of “Follow other vehicles” which does come under
the control of the machine agent while ACC is active.
For Control Level tasks there is a greater responsibility split. When
considering the agents’ responsibilities, the “Do” aspects of the “Control
Vehicle Speed” and “Negotiate Gradients” tasks can be coloured green as
they represent tasks covered by standard cruise control today. We have also
chosen to colour the “Monitor” responsibility for these tasks green. Being an
assistance system one could argue that all ACC monitoring tasks should be
blue. However, because the monitoring of these tasks requires only simple
closed loop control, which is unlikely to be adversely affected by external
factors, we argue that the monitoring work-load for the human driver would
be small.
With ACC having the capability to decrease vehicle speed and to follow
other vehicles the “Do” has been coloured green to designate that the machine
agent is responsible. The categorisation for “Monitor” is less clear. One can
quickly conceive of driving scenarios where “Follow other vehicles” cannot
be fully monitored by the machine. For example, if ACC is maintaining
the headway to the vehicle in front, when another vehicle cuts into that
gap and brakes, ACC may require the driver to intervene. Typically this
occurs because the level of braking force needed is greater than ACC is
authorised to command from the brake system. It would also be fair to
conclude that had this scenario occurred during manual driving, the human
driver would have reacted to the developing situation more quickly. Thus
needing a less aggressive braking response because their perception of the
traffic environment is greater – being able to both perceive objects in the
environment (SA Level 1), but also to project to a future state (SA Level 3).
When considering the responsibility for monitoring the “Decrease vehicle
speed” similar logic is applied, consequently “Monitor” is coloured blue.
Uniquely the “Do” responsibility for “Pulling Away from Standstill” has
been coloured blue. This is because our ACC vehicle feature requires the
driver to press the RESUME button, to re-activate ACC, once the vehicle
is stationary. ACC typically incorporates this behaviour for two reasons:
Firstly, to avoid a scenario where a pedestrian, with a poor RADAR cross-
section, goes undetected by ACC. Secondly, to avoid the potential hazard
of the driver turning their attention to a non-driving task while the vehi-
cle is stationary being totally unprepared when the vehicle does pull away.
Following the same logic that the correct behaviour of the “Pull away from
standstill” task can be adversely affected by what is going on around the
16
Figure 5: HTAoD Tasks with Responsibility Designation for ACC (SAE Level 1)
Figure 6: HTAoD Tasks with Responsibility Designation for ACC with Lane Centring
(SAE Level 2)
vehicle, “Monitor” has been designated as a shared task also.
4.1.2. ACC with Lane Centring (SAE Level 2)
ACC with Lane Centring is an evolution of ACC having increased capa-
bility to support the driver by maintaining the vehicle’s central position in
lane. While ACC is active, lane centring is achieved by the system continu-
ously applying torque to the steering rack. While ACC with Lane Centring
is active it is providing both longitudinal and lateral control simultaneously,
so is categorised as a Level 2 system by the SAE taxonomy [9].
Like ACC, all Strategy Level and all but one Manoeuvring Level task
remains under the control of the driver while the feature is active. The
only Manoeuvring Level task that we consider to be a shared task is ‘Follow
Other Vehicles’. Intuitively one might expect to see a Manoeuvring Level
steering task included in the HTAoD taxonomy, but no comparable steering
task appears at the Manoeuvring Level. Instead it is an unconscious Control
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Level task, buried in the application of a given manoeuvre.
Our ACC with Lane Centring vehicle feature is able to detect the driver’s
hands on the steering wheel, and will warn and ultimately disable the system
if the driver removes their hands from the steering wheel for a significant
period of time. Given this (near) constant engagement in the steering task the
responsibility for both “Perform Steering Actions” and “Undertake Direction
Control” have been assigned assuming that: the vehicle system will “Do” the
task, the human driver and the machine will share the “Monitor” task, while
the human driver is responsible for “Safety”. The similar task of “Negotiate
Bends” is considered to remain the responsibility of the human driver under
all conditions; given the relatively low level of steering authority that the
system has (i.e. correctly navigating anything other than a gentle Motorway
curve would require driver intervention).
The notion of the human driver correctly identifying the conditions in
which to enable or disable ACC with Lane Centring does identify a task, not
included in the HTAoD, namely a “Use Automation Appropriately” task.
Considering this new task in the context of the Enhanced VCM we postulate
that the “Use Automation Appropriately” task would be undertaken at the
Strategy Level by the human driver. For the human driver to carry out this
task effectively they not only rely on the correct perception of the Traffic
and Physical Environments, but they also need to understand the capabil-
ities and limitation of the automation being used. We postulate that the
driver will have feature behaviour mental models stored within the Models
/ Perception element that will have developed over time through using the
feature, experimentation, and possibly through reading the Driver’s Hand-
book! Consequently, the accuracy of the driver’s ACC with Lane Centring
mental model, regarding capability and appropriateness of use [41], will be
largely dependent on when and where the driver used the feature previously,
and how the feature appeared to respond. For example, a RADAR sen-
sor blocked with packed snow could adversely affect longitudinal control if
not detected. To maintain safety the driver would need awareness [42] that
the systems had lost capability, so that they could cancel ACC with Lane
Centring and resume manual control before the loss of capability led to po-
tentially hazardous behaviour. Figure 7 uses the Enhanced Model to explore
this scenario where fog or falling snow is affecting the automation’s ability
to correctly perceive other vehicles and lane markings.
ACC with Lane Centring raises further questions about how the human
driver’s awareness of the driving task and their perception of the surroundings
18
Figure 7: Using ACC with Lane Centring (SAE Level 2) with the Physical Environment
Influencing Automation
might change. Although both longitudinal and lateral control are considered
to be Control Level tasks, it is suggested that whether longitudinal or lateral
vehicle control is automated has an effect on the human driver’s response,
engagement with automation, and ability to regain control; with the sugges-
tion being that the driver will focus less far ahead of their own vehicle when
lateral control is automated compared to longitudinal control [2]. A situation
that is probably exacerbated by a less engaged and drowsy driver. Figure 8
uses the Enhanced Model to capture the idea of a loss of driver attentiveness.
4.1.3. Traffic Jam Assist (SAE Level 3)
The feature Traffic Jam Assist (TJA) is a further evolution of ACC with
Lane Centring, giving the driver a near “hands and feet off” driving experi-
ence within a very constrained operating scenario. Typically, the Operational
Design Domain (ODD) specifies that the vehicle is operated at relatively low
speeds (e.g. below 65 km/h) in congested traffic. Once activated TJA will
control vehicle steering, acceleration and braking to maintain the vehicle’s
position in lane and within the traffic queue. Once the driver has engaged
TJA they are considered to have relinquished control to the system, however
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Figure 8: ACC with Lane Centring (SAE Level 2), a stationary obstruction and an inat-
tentive driver
the driver must remain vigilant and intervene to maintain safety if circum-
stances require. For this reason the system is considered to be a Level 3
system [9].
The SAE taxonomy defines Level 3 as a system having full vehicle control
in a given context, but without the capability to maintain safety in that same
context. Given the safety concerns this raises, a “true” Level 3 system would
likely be considered unsuitable for production. Instead the system would
need to maintain some level of availability, to enable the driver to regain
manual control successfully. For example, if the system fails to confirm that
the return to manual control has been successful then it will switch on the
vehicle’s hazard lights and bring the vehicle to a controlled stop in lane.
Considering the HTAoD in the context of TJA, the increased influence
that automation has over vehicle control becomes evident; with only the “Un-
dertake direction control”, “Negotiate Bends” and “Reverse Vehicle” Control
Level tasks being unaffected by the feature. Of those Control Level tasks in-
fluenced by TJA, the “Do,” “Monitor,” and “Safety” attribute for each task
have been rated as “vehicle system” (green), “vehicle system” (green), and
“shared” (blue) respectively.
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Figure 9: HTAoD Tasks with Responsibility Designation for Traffic Jam Assist (Level 3)
The influence that TJA has over the Manoeuvring Level tasks is still
quite limited, with “Deal with Road Related Hazards” and “React to Other
Traffic” being influenced in addition to “Follow Other Vehicles” which was
influenced by the vehicle features discussed previously (see Sections 4.1.1
and 4.1.2). Our assessment of TJA suggests that 8 out of 26 task groups
considered will be affected by the feature, with the automated tasks allowing
the driver to effectively remove themselves from the vehicle control loop. In
such cases how does the driver maintain sufficient SA to intervene should a
situation affecting safety arise? And if the driver has relinquished control
to the automation, will they be capable of delivering a measured and timely
response if the situation requires it? Long standing human factors thinking
would suggest that once out of the control loop humans are not good at
monitoring what the control is doing [43] and more recent specific research
into the resumption of steering control would suggest that drivers are slower
to respond to situations once out of the loop, and when the driver’s response
does come then its magnitude may be too large or even erratic [13].
From a controllability perspective the perception and SA models required
by the driver are complex. For TJA the human driver needs to maintain SA
of both the Traffic Environment and Complete Vehicle Behaviour. However,
to achieve that requires good system behaviour mental models, such that
they can correctly judge when to intervene to maintain safety. Ultimately, a
vehicle feature’s capability, and ability to correctly sense its environment, is
a function of the sensor suite. While writing this paper we looked at man-
ufacturers’ marketing material available and found similar sounding vehicle
features have quite different sensor sets and hence capabilities. For exam-
ple, Audi offers TJA features on its Q2 and Q7 models. However, with its
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richer sensor set, the Q7 vehicle has the ability to follow the preceding vehi-
cle convoy around a stationary object (e.g. the marketing video shows the
vehicle manoeuvring around a stranded vehicle that is partially on the hard-
shoulder and partially in the ‘live’ lane) [44] whereas the Q2 does not have
this capability. In addition to the missing Strategy Level “Use Automation
Appropriately” driving task discussed in Section 4.1.2 there is perhaps then
the need for a “Monitor Automation” Manoeuvring Level driving task as well
[45]. Although as seen with TJA, what this task demands is dependent on
the capability of the automation.
5. Discussion
5.1. The Enhanced Vehicle Risk Model
Fundamental to the safe operation of a vehicle is having and maintaining
SA of the ever-changing environment, with mental models being critical to
maintaining SA [26]. Reflecting on this in the context of the MISRA VCM
(Figure 1) highlights the need to model human cognition within the En-
hanced VCM; particularly the potentially stark difference in environmental
perception capability between the human and the machine. If the perception
capability of the automation is less than that of the human driver, then we
suggest that the resultant system behaviour could be unexpected, unwanted
or result in the human developing an incorrect mental model of the automa-
tion’s actual behaviour. The potential for either the human being surprised
by the automation, or the automation responding more slowly or incorrectly
compared to the human, led us to add perception and error blocks to the
original diagram in addition to a hierarchical control model.
5.2. Preliminary Evaluation
The Enhanced VCM has been considered in the context of three use cases
to give a preliminary evaluation of its utility. Three vehicle features (ACC,
ACC with Lane Centring and TJA), having increasing levels of automation
authority where chosen for this evaluation.
Considering the Follow Other Vehicle task, in the context of ACC, high-
lighted the potential affect of differences in perception (see Section 5.1) for
the cut-in scenario. In this scenario the automation is unable to perceive a
vehicle cutting in from an adjacent lane, so will not brake until the ‘cut in’
vehicle is well into the ego vehicle’s own lane. However, with the driver still
in the control loop and situationally aware, they will typically react quickly
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to other visual cues and cancel ACC well before the other vehicle encroaches
into their lane.
The analysis of ACC with Lane Centring uncovered a new Strategic Level
driver task of “Use Automation Appropriately”. Due to sensing capabilities
and the level of authority afforded to the vehicle feature (e.g. amount of
steering and braking torque that the system is allowed to apply to the vehicle
smart actuators) the driver will need to understand the capabilities of the
feature and only operate the system when it is safe and appropriate to do
so. To “Use Automation Appropriately” and to successfully intervene when
needed, requires the driver to not only be situationally aware, but also to
have knowledge of the automation’s capability [41].
Giving the driver the new task of “Monitor Automation” is perhaps an
obvious consequence of adding automation to driving. However, discussing
TJA in the context of the Enhanced VCM does highlight how the “Monitor
Automation” task could become quite complex for SAE Levels 3 and 4 au-
tomation; particularly if the driver moves between vehicles, having similarly
named HAD features, but with very different system capabilities.
5.3. Further Evaluations
Our initial evaluation has demonstrated that HAD features can be dis-
cussed in the context of the Enhanced VCM (Figure 3). Having “tested” the
model’s applicability in the broadest sense, further evaluations are planned to
further explore the model’s applicability, and to develop an analysis method
that will support automotive hazard analyses.
5.3.1. Cooperation
A cognitive system is defined as “a system that can modify its behaviour on
the basis of experience so as to achieve specific anti-entropic ends”. As such,
the activity of driving can be viewed as a joint cognitive system (JCS); as a
combination of actions are required, within the context of sometimes unpre-
dictable and dynamic environment [46]. The three HAD features (Sections
4.1.1 to 4.1.3) previously discussed highlighted the importance of the human
machine interface in maintaining safety. However, until this point we have
only made generalisations about how SA, perception and an understanding of
automation performance might impact safety. When considering HAD safe
operation and the ego vehicle’s behaviour in relation to that of other vehi-
cles, the importance of the human and machine agents cooperating to achieve
timely and effective control responses is evident; particularly regarding the
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correct application of evasive manoeuvres. However, with the expectation
being that increased automation will detrimentally impact a driver’s SA and
reaction time (time to engage) [2], while misunderstandings regarding the au-
tomation’s capability might result in the automation issuing more take-over
requests, we feel it important to add a temporal dimension to the Enhanced
VCM. But what form should this temporal dimension take?
The Contextual Control Model (COCOM) is a cyclical model of human
action, with competencies being the possible actions that can be taken, con-
trol being the way in which competencies are chosen, while constructs de-
scribe the context in which the action is carried out [46]. Although con-
temporary research now suggests that the human cognition actually uses a
process of predictive processing [35], that is continuously predicting its own
sensory inputs and acting upon the predictive error, the competency, control,
constructs loop is probably still a useful model. An extension of COCOM
is the Enhanced Control Model (ECOM). This model incorporates multiple
control loop layers, to reflect the many layers of activities normally taking
place concurrently within a JCS. By considering how control is lost, regained
and performance changed, the suggestion is that ECOM provides a useful
framework from which to explore the effects of automation on JCS [46]. We
therefore plan to incorporate the ECOM framework into the Enhanced VCM
to see if the resulting model does provide insight into the identification of
hazards associated with the temporal nature of control and the impact of
automation. This is the subject of our future research.
5.3.2. Risk Analysis Methods
Our future research also involves developing an analysis method to ac-
company the Enhanced VCM. For this we will consider the systemic analysis
techniques of FRAM and STPA; to identify and evaluate whether it is appro-
priate to incorporate such techniques into our method. Although potentially
time consuming, FRAM has been identified as an enabling technique for iden-
tifying interactions between system functions that are critical, and the system
dynamics that emerge given variability in those reactions [47]. Furthermore,
when combined with Rasmussen’s Abstraction Hierarchy, FRAM’s utility in
analysing multi-layer functionality has been demonstrated [48]. The STPA
analysis technique [49] is becoming the de facto safety analysis method used
by the automotive ADAS development community. However, evidence would
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suggest that the models produced are complex8.
Taking these ideas further, could the Enhanced VCM be used as a frame-
work from which to analysis HAD functional hierarchies, systemic interac-
tions and variances? Furthermore, given the popularity of STPA within the
automotive domain could the Enhanced VCM be used to minimise model
complex when STPA is used in an automotive context? These ideas will be
the subject of our future research.
5.3.3. The Task of Driving
The HTAoD taxonomy provided a useful prompt when considering the
dynamic driving task in the context of increasing automation. Particularly,
what tasks constituted Driver Control (Figure 1) in any given scenario, and
where each task should reside within the Strategy, Manoeuvring and Control
Levels (Figure 3). However, being a taxonomy for manual driving it does
lack the tasks associated with vehicle automation. As identified in Section 4
this could require the inclusion of the Strategy Level task of “Use Automation
Appropriately” and Manoeuvring Level tasks of “Monitor Automation” and
“Resume Direction Control”. Therefore, any automation analysis method
that incorporates the HTAoD taxonomy will need to be expanded to include
these new tasks.
With contemporary methods like FRAM and STPA analysing a system’s
functional, a taxonomy that is functional rather than task based would proba-
bly be more appropriate. Indeed, recent literature [50, 51] does describe HAD
features, including Traffic Jam Pilot and Highway Pilot, using a generic func-
tional hierarchy. The identification of a suitable driving activity taxonomy,
be it task or functional based, for our analysis method will be the subject of
further research.
6. Conclusions
Within this paper we have presented an Enhanced VCM, which is based
on the MISRA Control System View of the Vehicle model, but that incor-
porates contemporary research concepts to extend the model’s utility in an
HAD context. Although we have presented the enhanced model purely from
8The Control Structure Diagram presented in Functional Safety Assessment of an Au-
tomated Lane Centering System contains 26 individual system elements [31].
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the perspective of automotive based automation, generic human factors con-
cepts have been used. Therefore, we expect these concepts and our con-
ceptual model to work equally well with plant models in other operating
contexts. We have described the intent of the model’s elements and used
three ADAS vehicle features (i.e. ACC, ACC with Lane Centring and TJA),
having progressively higher authority over vehicle control, to elaborate the
meaning behind each model element. Then the HTAoD taxonomy has been
used to focus on driving tasks where a shared responsibility, and hence po-
tential hazard cause exists. The Enhanced VCM has allowed us to discuss
potential hazards caused by differing perception levels between the human
and the machine. However, without the ability to reason about the tempo-
ral nature of that interaction, we expect potential hazard causes to remain
undiscovered. For the Enhanced VCM to become a useful addition to the
automotive safety analyst’s ‘tool box’ not only does it need to include a tem-
poral element, but it also requires an accompanying method. These aspects
are the focus of our future research.
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